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A Basis for Civility 
PHILIP D. SMITH 
G ive attention, if you will, to the virtue of civility. In this essay I want to define civility, then give a bit of its history, continue by predicting something of its future, and conclude by explaining 
civility's true ground, at least as I understand it. 
We are not here interested in politeness or courtesy, though those 
meanings of "civility" may be ancillary to our topic. We are thinking instead 
about the political realm, and we are aware that many voices have been 
raised to decry the mean-spirited and vicious nature of politics, both in 
attaining and using public office. \Vise people warn us that democratic gov­
ernance depends on a kind of self-control, by which the participants in the 
process guard it against internal meltdown. We ought to give careful atten­
tion to civility, for democracy may depend on it. 
Readers may find much to which they object in this essay, but they will 
agree that it marks off an interesting topic for discussion. Suggested correc­
tions, at any point, are welcome. The most important thing comes last, for I 
hope readers will approve of what I say about the ground of civility even if 
they disagree with my account of what it is, what its history has been, or 
what its future may be. 
A Definition of Civility 
Civility has to do with treating political opponents well. 
We set the stage by first defining "politics." Politics is the art or science 
of making decisions for groups of people. Note that by this definition, many 
activities count as political. Besides the politics of various kinds of govern­
ments, this definition includes office politics, church politics, family politics, 
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and university politics. "Politics" has a negative connotation in many minds, 
but this need not be. Whenever groups of people need to make decisions, 
there will be political decision-making. Sometimes political decisions are 
made badly (unjustly, stupidly, or whatever), but sometimes they are made 
well. Some political systems tend to produce more bad decisions than oth­
ers-but that is the stuff of political theory, not the topic of this essay. 
With this broad definition of politics in mind, we can ask interesting 
questions about morality and politics. For instance, people often distinguish 
political allies from political enemies, and we treat them very differently. I 
am particularly interested in how we treat-more precisely, how we should 
treat-our political enemies.1 The answer, I think, is that we should treat 
our political opponents well. 
W hat does it mean to treat one's political opponents well? For starters, 
here are some prohibitions. We should not lie about our political oppo­
nents; we should not attack their positions with "straw man" arguments, ad 
hominem arguments, or other fallacious arguments; we should not break our 
agreements with them; and we should not unnecessarily impute evil motives 
to them. Positively, we should negotiate in good faith with our political ene­
mies; we should debate issues honestly with them; and we should respect 
them. 
More could be added, but this gives some idea of what I mean by treat­
ing political opponents well. Provisionally, I define "civility" to be a virtue, 
that is, it is a properly grounded character trait (or combination of traits) which 
moves individuals or groups to treat political opponents well. Later, I will suggest 
some modification of this definition, but it gives us enough to go on for 
now. 
Notice the qualification "properly grounded" in the definition. It is 
possible for someone to be motivated to treat his political opponents well 
for wrong reasons. Perhaps, like Aristotle's ignorant soldier, he does not 
understand the cost of virtue; he blithely assumes that every thing will turn 
out fine. Just as we would not say that a soldier who fails to comprehend 
danger is truly brave, we would not say that a politician who had no idea 
that treating his political opponents well Inight bring political defeat is truly 
civil. Or, like Aristotle's professional soldier, someone Inight exhibit a 
merely instrumental pseudo-virtue. If we treat political opponents well 
because we calculate that such behavior is the best way to win, we are not 
truly civil, just calculating. 
True civility is the trait or traits of character that move one to treat 
one's political opponents well for the right reasons. Further on, I will sug­
gest what I think those reasons should be. But first we should look at the 
reasons that have been traditionally given as grounds for civility. 
1. I think there are also interesting issues surrounding the way we treat political allies, 
but those matters are not the topic of this paper. 
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A Modernist Virtue 
In October, 1555, Hugh Latimer was executed during the reign of 
England's "Bloody" Mary. He was burned at the stake with a fellow protes­
tant, Nicholas Ridley. As recorded in the martyrology, Acts and Monuments, 
by John Foxe, Latimer cried out when the fire was laid to the fuel: "Be of 
good comfort, Mr. Ridley, and play the man! We shall this day light such a 
candle, by God's grace, in England, as I trust never shall be put out."2 
Latimer's courage when faced with death, and his good fortune to have 
his death recorded in a popular martyrology, made him into a hero/saint of 
the English reformation. What generations of readers of protestant history 
didn't read, however, was that some y ears before his own execution, Latimer 
presided over a "'jolly muster,' as a traditional-minded friar, John Forest, 
was roasted alive over a fire made of a wooden statue of a saint hauled out of 
a pilgrimmage church."3 
Latimer's life and death is only one, though fairly gruesome, reminder 
that Christians have not always treated their political enemies well. Medi­
eval and Reformation histories are replete with imprisonments, tortures, 
executions, and treacheries. Undoubtedly, many motivations and circum­
stances lie behind such behaviors. People acted out of greed, fear, 
superstition, hatred-the whole catalogue of human sinfulness. But part of 
the reason for some of this incivility, particularly in a case like Latimer's, was 
philosophical. 
All sides in reformation disputes assumed that there was such a thing as 
true doctrine. If someone rejected true doctrine, he earned God's judgment 
of eternal death, so if torture could bring about repentance, it was actually 
good for the offender. Further, the heretic was a public blasphemer who 
deserved death. Finally, innocent people might be corrupted if they listened 
to the heretic's ideas. Matters of truth, especially of religious truth, were 
regarded as having highest importance-literally infinite importance. These 
factors produced a logic of intolerance. Those with positions of influence or 
power, such as Queen Mary, or Latimer himself when he presided over For­
est's death, felt they had a duty to do all they could to eliminate heresy. 
We should remember all this, because the ideological cold war between 
Protestants and Catholics formed much of the background to the emer­
gence of modern philosophy.4 Louis Dupre has argued recently that we 
2. "A Tale of Two Martyrs" Christian History (Vol. XIV, No. 4), 18-19. 
3. Martin, Dennis. "Catholic Counterpoint: What was it like to be on the losing side of 
England's Reformation?" Christian History (Vol. XIV; No. 4), 30. 
4. I owe to George Marsden the likening of the Protestant/Catholic conflict of the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries to the anti-Marxist/Marxist conflict of the twentieth. Both 
cold wars were protracted struggles, they were interrupted by "hot" wars, and they mixed 
nationalism with ideology. Cf. Marsden, George. Religion and American Culture (Fort Worth, 
TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1990), 12-13. 
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should be wary of oversimplifying our accounts of the emergence of the 
modern worldview, and he is probably right; significant changes in Euro­
pean intellectual history going back to the thirteenth century are part of the 
story of the development of modernity.5 Nevertheless, there is also merit in 
the traditional identification of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as 
the beginning of the modern era. Dupre describes the Enlightenment as a 
canonizing of options which had first been opened by the first phase of the 
passage to modernity. 6 One of those options, which the Enlightenment can­
onized as a settled principle, was a turn from authority to rationality as 
ground for knowledge. 
During the Catholic/Protestant cold war, both sides appealed to 
authority-of scripture or of church-to certify truth. Early modem philos­
ophers from Descartes and Leibniz to Hume and Kant appealed rather to 
reason. Many saw this not only as intellectually better, since appeal to 
authority was akin to superstition while appeal to reason was akin to science, 
but also practically better, since religious appeals to authority played so eas­
ily into the hand of warmakers. It was the Europe of 1648 and after, tired 
out by a hundred years of religious wars, that accepted a new worldview. To 
be sure, the cold war continued, but it played a gradually decreasing role in 
international politics, and to an ever-increasing degree Europe's intellectu­
als looked to reason rather than authority.7 
It is hard to generalize about such things, but we probably owe the 
emergence of the virtue of civility to Enlightenment modernism. With phi­
losophers like Hume, and especially Kant, the modern worldview changed 
the way Europeans thought about political enemies. If reasonable people 
can differ, and if a person's dignity is founded on his or her reason, then 
even people who disagree with each other ought to be able to respect and 
tolerate each other. It is not a remarkable coincidence that while Kant was 
explaining that the categorical imperative, which was the product of reason 
alone, required that we treat all people as ends and not merely means, T ho­
mas Jefferson and other American reformers were enshrining religious 
freedom and toleration as fundamental principles of government. It was a 
fundamental assumption of the Enlightenment, which Kant only made 
5. See Dupre, Louis. Passage to Modernity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 
To oversimplifY, Dupre's thesis is that the Enlightenment, which is usually thought of as the 
beginning of the modern era, was the second of two important revolutions in thought that 
transformed the Medieval world into the modern world. His book charts the first, largely thir­
teenth century, revolution. 
6. Dupre, 253. 
7. It's easy to overstate and oversimplifY. Medieval philosophers and theologians did not 
denigrate reason. But, like Aquinas, they sought to bring their theorizing under the authority 
of church, creed, and scripture. I take it that one mark of a modern philosopher is that he or 
she will not submit the products of philosophical investigation to external authority. 
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more explicit than most of his contemporaries, that Reason was the same for 
all people. Universal rationality was the modernist basis for civility. 
Postmodern Prospects for Civility 
We live, as the culture watchers constantly din into our ears, in a post­
modern world. If Dupre is right, in one sense this is simply not true. Our 
culture is still working out the implications of the breakup of the ancient 
and medieval worldviews; in that sense we are still moderns. What the cul­
ture watchers have right is that we no longer accept some of the principles 
of the Enlightenment. 
To illustrate: The modernist (whether of the fourteenth century, the 
eighteenth century or the twentieth century) believes that the now is a sig­
nificantly new thing. 8 All modernists believe that the contingencies of time 
produce fundamental reshapings of knowledge and reality. (Ancient and 
medieval worldviews denied that true knowledge or reality could undergo 
fundamental change.) Some modernists, Enlightenment modernists, 
believed that changes over time exhibited progress. Some contemporary 
modernists, who call themselves post-modernists because they define mod­
ernism by the Enlightenment, have come to disbelieve in progress. They 
worry: If the human race is not progressing morally, is it really good that we 
are gaining more technological power? So, while all modernists (in Dupre's 
sense) believe that time has produced basic change, some of them have 
given up thinking that change is progress. 
Something significant happens when our contemporaries reject princi­
ples of the Enlightenment, even if "post-modernism" may be an 
inappropriate description of that rejection. Now, one of the most widely 
proclaimed post-modernist (or anti-Enlightenment) assumptions is the 
rejection of universal rationality. The standards of reason, especially the 
standards of practical reason, which Enlightenment philosophers like Kant 
assumed to be universal, are labeled partial and parochial by post-modern­
ists. Some people, who accept certain assumptions about individualism, 
objectivism, and self-interested rationality-that is, people with Enlighten­
ment worldviews-will approach problems of practical reason in ways that 
Kant or Hume or Hobbes would recognize as rational. But other people do 
not think that way. So "rationality" means different things to different peo­
ples, say the post-modernists. 
This post-modem rejection of universal reason is surely right. Alasdair 
Macintyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, persuades me that even in 
the West we have several different traditions of practical reason, competing 
for our allegiance.9 Autonomous reason, a capitalized "Reason" that stands 
8. Cf. Dupre, 145. 
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alone independent of historically conditioned reasoners, does not exist 
unless in the mind of God. 
So the Enlightenment assumption of universal rationality is under­
mined. Post-modernists find they no longer believe in it. "What happens to 
civility in these conditions? 
For an Enlightenment modernist, a political opponent can be assumed 
to be a reasonable person. The political opponent can be appealed to on 
grounds of good evidence or clear reasoning. The political opponent, a rea­
sonable person, is worthy of respect, even if disagreements persist between 
competing parties. The implications of Kant's categorical imperative are 
quite clear: We can work to defeat our political opponents-in a sense, they 
are obstacles to be overcome, means to our ends-but we may never treat 
political opponents as merely obstacles. We must always treat them as ends 
in themselves. Even further, since our worst political opponents are rational 
seekers of truth, they are actually our allies. Through vigorous debate, seek­
ers pursue the truth together. 
But post-modernists need not believe this. The post-modernist does 
not assume that all people are "reasonable." Rather, some people are rea­
sonable in one way, while others are reasonable in another way, and still 
others are reasonable in still other ways-and the various kinds of rational­
ity may be incommensurable and irreconcilable. There is no way to appeal 
to all political eneinies on the grounds of evidence (they may not see the 
evidence as relevant) or good reasons (they may reject the assumptions 
behind the reasons). Therefore there is no compelling need to treat political 
eneinies with respect. After all, some political eneinies are most easily dealt 
with summarily: we see them just as obstacles. There is no independent 
standard of rationality which would require us to treat them as more than 
obstacles. 
Some post-modernists, like Richard Rorty, still urge civility and other 
liberal values. But he does not urge this on the basis of some truth about the 
universe or ourselves. Rather, this is just the way liberal people happen to 
feel.10 
I suspect-this is where I pull out my crystal ball and predict-that we 
shall soon hear from post-modern voices that do not urge civility. Like 
Nietzsche, they will call us to a bracing acceptance of our "thisness": "I am 
this, and I want that. My political enemy is that which stands between me 
and the fulfillment of my desire." From a subjectivist point of view, the 
enemy is and can be nothing more than an obstacle. And there is no objec­
tive point of view (objectivity is another Enlightenment concept 
deconstructed by post-modernists) to correct the subjectivist's point of view. 
9. Macintyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), Cf. pp. 1-11 for an initial statement of his position, which is argued 
at length throughout the book. 
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In short, I predict dark days ahead for civility. As we know it, civility is 
largely the gift of Enlightenment assumptions that we no longer make. 
Those who feel like it, or whose historically contingent way of exercising 
practical reason recommends it, will continue to treat their political oppo­
nents well and train themselves in the virtues that motivate such behavior. 
But as people come to recognize their feelings in this regard and the ways 
they have learned to think about this matter as pure historical accidents, 
they will have little defense against the temptations of incivility. 
Solid Ground for Civility 
All of this suggests an historical irony, given the history of civility out­
lined above. Though Christians of the modern era have learned to regard 
civility as a virtue through the influence of Enlightenment modernism, it is 
Christian doctrine, not modernist philosophy, which provides a sufficient 
foundation for civility. 
This may seem surprising. After all, according to my brief account of 
reformation disputes, it was the Christian assumption that true doctrine had 
great importance that lay behind a logic of intolerance. "Since we have the 
truth, the heretic must be made to see that it is the truth." Right? 
Wrong. The assumption that truth exists is not the problem. We need 
further assumptions to create the logic of intolerance. First, we need to 
think that we have the right formulation of the truth. Second, we assume 
that we gain our right formulation of the truth independently of the 
thought of those who disagree with us. Third, we believe that the truth is 
itself compatible with intolerance. A "fallibilist" rejects the first two of these 
assumptions; that is, a fallibilist will always keep alive in her mind the possi­
bility that she is wrong, and she will believe that opposing views are useful 
in the pursuit of truth. Some philosophers have suggested that fallibilism is, 
or is part of, the cure for intolerance.11 It may be that we should be falli­
bilists about our political positions and many other beliefs we hold. 
However, rather than dipping into that debate, I want to take issue with the 
third assumption just mentioned. 
10. Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), Cf. p. 189: " . . .  a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying 
for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contin­
gent historical circumstance." And pp. 197-98: "There is no neutral, non circular way to defend 
the liberal's claim that cruelty is the worst thing we do, any more than there is a neutral way to 
back up Nietzsche's assertion that this claim expressed a resentful, slavish attitude . . . .  We can­
not look back behind the processes of socialization which convinced us twentieth-century lib­
erals of the validity of this claim and appeal to something which is more "real" or less 
ephemeral that the historical contingencies which brought those processes into existence. We 
have to start from where we are . . . . " 
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Most parties to reformation disputes, and many political groups in the 
generations since, have assumed that truth is compatible with the forcible 
suppression of error. They have thought that truth is so important that 
error must be suppressed. But what if the content of truth was itself incom­
patible with incivility? If that were the case, it would be possible for a 
person to hold a truth with absolute certainty, and believe that opposing 
views are useless in the pursuit of truth, and still have good reasons for 
being civil. 12 
My belief is that truth is incompatible with intolerance or incivility. 
The proper grounds for civility are not to be found in fallibilism, but in the 
truth itself. It is not because I am uncertain of the doctrines I espouse that I 
listen attentively to those who disagree with me, but because of the content 
of those doctrines. 
W hat truth or doctrines could I be referring to? Just this, the heart of 
Christianity: Jesus Christ died for sinners, that is, for his enemies. 
Christian dogma teaches us that we, who made ourselves God's ene­
mies, are the objects of his love. His love overcame that emnity and made us 
his friends, through the cross. Jesus' words, expressed on the cross about the 
particular soldiers who crucified him, express his attitude toward all his ene­
mies: "Father, forgive them, for they don't know what they' re doing" (Luke 
23:34). 
Christian truth requires civility in at least three ways. 1. Because God, 
in Christ, loved his enemies, Christians have no option but to try to love 
their enemies. Christ is our example. 2. Further, Jesus explicitly told his fol­
lowers to love their enemies. Christ is our lawgiver. 3. Further still, as the 
light of the world, Jesus is the light in every person. We should look for the 
light of Christ in everyone, including our enemies. Christ is our logos of 
civility. 13 
11. Cf. Quinn, Philip L. "Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious," 
the Presidential Address delivered at the 93rd Annual Central Division Meeting of the Ameri­
can Philosophical Association, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa­
tion, Vol. 69, No. 2, 47. Quinn agrees with other writers who think that fallibilism ought not to 
be a requirement of discourse in the public square, since such a requirement would exclude 
certain religious traditions, which explicitly reject fallibilism, from joining in political debate. 
In this regard it is helpful to remember the form of fallibilism of the dissenting puritans in 
the Westminster Assembly, who helped move English society from the religious wars of the 
sixteenth century to the Act ofToleration in 1689. Although the Dissenters did not carry the day 
during the Westminster Assembly, they argued that differences of opinion among Christians 
were due to the weakness of human apprehension of the truth, and that differences of opinion 
could lead to fuller apprehension of the truth. Thus, the Dissenters' position anticipated that of 
fallibilists. Cf. Koivisto, Rex. One Lord, One Faith: A Theology for Cross-Denominational Renewal 
(Wheaton, IL: Victor Books/SP Publications, Inc. 1993), 98-101. 
12. These comments should not be construed as meaning that I reject fallibilism. The 
point is that one need not be a fallibilist to have good grounds for civility. We don't have to 
convert people to fallibilism to convert them to civility. 
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Part of the irony, of course, is that though Christians have always had 
perfectly good reasons to treat their enemies well, they failed to do so and 
had to learn civility from Enlightenment philosophers. T his was not just 
because Christians failed to live up to their understanding of the gospel, but 
because they partly failed to understand the gospel. Part of the Quaker mis­
sion in history, it seems to me, has been to help correct that 
misunderstanding. Quakers, who understand that the light of Christ is 
present in others, even enemies, can help other Christians to see that civility 
is a virtue. 
If my earlier prediction comes true, we will hear Nietzsche-like post­
modern voices that forthrightly reject civility. I hope my prediction does not 
come true; it would be better to live in a culture that honors civility than to 
be an accurate forecaster. But even if some around us find that they no 
longer have reasons to be civil, Christians should not be deterred from 
training themselves in this virtue. We want to be like Christ; we want to 
obey his commands; and we want to recognize Christ in all people, includ­
ing our political opponents. 
In conclusion, a small correction to my definition of civility should be 
made. I defined civility as a character trait (or traits) which moves one to 
treat enemies well. As it stands, that definition is act oriented, as if right 
actions were of first importance and virtues consisted in propensities to 
carry out right actions. I don't think that is the way we should understand 
the relationship of actions and virtues, but it is hard to express the inter­
twined nature of doing and being without extending this essay far too much. 
Perhaps it is enough to say that Christians ought to strive to be civil as much 
as they ought to act civilly.14 
13. Readers might compare this idea-that Christ is the logos of our civility-to Arthur 
Roberts' paper, "Good and Evil in a World Threatened by Nuclear Omnicide: A Proposed 
Epistemological Paradigm." The paradigm he proposes posits rational, sensory, and intuitive 
modes of apprehending truth, modes which different individuals combine in varying ways. 
Such a model reinforces for us the need to listen to others. Other people, even political oppo­
nents, can teach us something of the logos, the center toward which we must move if we want to 
progress morally, intellectually or esthetically. 
14. Thanks to Paul Anderson for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
